This paper studies the structure of the employment relationship in organizations. It investigates the trade-off rms face between making commitments to their workforce as a whole (multilateral relational contracts), and making more limited commitments to individuals or smaller groups of employees (bilateral relational contracts). Multilateral contracts bind the rm more strongly to implicit commitments, improving motivation, but are dif cult to adjust in response to changes in the environment. Bilateral contracts make workforce changes easier to implement. The framework helps to explain the use of relative performance evaluation, why rms rely on temporary employees, and the adoption of two-tier workforces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Why do rms hesitate to cut pay or lay off workers in economic downturns? Why do some rms promote the idea of lifelong employee commitment, while others explicitly back away from such policies or hire temporary workers with low tenure expectations? In this paper I present a simple model of employment as a long-term relationship between a rm and its workers and show that these phenomena, and others, can be understood as attempts by rms to optimally structure relational contracts with employees. 1 In particular, I consider the trade-off between emphasizing a broad commitment to all employees and making more targeted commitments to individual employees or groups of employees. The former, modeled as a multilateral relational contract, may increase motivation, but can limit exibility and make changes more dif cult than having separate bilateral contracts. I identify conditions that favor one arrangement over the other and discuss the implications of both for issues such as incentive provision and compensation.
The approach I take stresses the contractual relationship between rms and their workforce as a whole, rather than the relationship between rms and individual employees. This is crucial for addressing many incentive issues. For instance, there is extensive evidence that managers believe selective pay cuts or layoffs will trigger widespread morale problems and lowered performance [Doeringer and Piore 1971; Bewley 1999] . Bewley argues that this is very dif cult to reconcile with existing economic theories of employment. There are some striking examples of rms facing dif culties when they had to back away from what employees perceived as a blanket policy of employment security for those who performed well. Both Hewlett-Packard and IBM were cited for decades as having strong commitments to employment security; and both faced widespread employee discontent when market conditions forced them to lay off workers and change other aspects of their employment policies in the late 1980s and early 1990s [Mills and Friesen 1996; Rogers and Beer 1995] . Of course, they may be exceptional in having been forced to alter their policies so dramatically; there are many examples of rms that have upheld implicit promises of job security in the face of adverse circumstances by going to four-day weeks or exible hours, or relocating or retraining workers.
2
One way rms can avoid or mitigate the consequences of layoffs or other organizational changes is to set separate expectations for different employees or sets of employees. A stark example of this might be the use of temporary labor, as in the case of Microsoft. In the 1980s and 1990s Microsoft employed thousands of "permatemp" workers, many of whom enjoyed long tenures and worked on the same projects as regular workers. Yet permatemps were issued orange badges rather than the blue badges of regular workers, were not invited to the annual company picnic, and were prohibited from joining company social clubs or using company basketball courts. The president of a company that supplied some of Microsoft's permatemps explained to The New York Times that these practices served to align expectations: "when people know it's a temporary arrangement, someday when the assignment ends, there's not a sense of broken trust."
3 Interestingly, following their respective bouts with layoffs in the late 1980s, both IBM and Hewlett-Packard also moved to increase their reliance on temporary workers.
In this paper I model employment as a repeated game between the rm and its employees, and view the process of setting worker expectations as the choice between different forms of relational contract. A relational contract describes prospective behavior in the repeated game and is self-enforcing if the behavior it describes constitutes an equilibrium. Under a multilateral contract, the rm maintains its promises because it fears that any deviation will lead to a breakdown in its relationship with all of its workers. In contrast, bilateral contracts have the feature that the rm may violate a promise to a small set of workers, but retain the goodwill of others. 4 The bene t of multilateral contracting is familiar from the industrial organization literature on multimarket contact: it increases the sanctions following a deviation [Bernheim and Whinston 1990; Bendor and Mookherjee 1990] . In the employment context, this gives the rm greater credibility in promising to reward performance by its employees. Formally, rather than having a separate incentive constraint for each worker, a multilateral contract needs only to satisfy the sum of individual constraints. This allows a form of cross subsidization to support performance incentives that might not otherwise be self-enforcing. I show that this cross subsidization leads rms to balance incentives across the organization, and that it favors relative performance evaluation even if there is no correlation between the performance measures of different employees. I also show that rms can benet most from it when they enjoy strong bargaining power vis-à -vis their employees and when employees' talents are substitutable rather than complementary in the production process.
The cost of being bound tightly to a set of implicit promises is that rms may nd it dif cult to extricate themselves from these commitments if the environment should change. In Section IV, I extend the basic model to allow for changes in the productive environment and uncertainty regarding future changes. In response to shocks, the rm must adjust or rework its relational contracts, a process that requires communicating to all involved parties. I consider the implications if this process is imperfect, so there is always a danger of a misunderstanding that will lead to a breakdown of the relationship. This creates an inertia in contract structure: contracts will not adjust to small shocks. Moreover, multilateral contracts will tend to have higher costs of adjustment. A consequence is that if the environment is unstable, and the rm believes it will be dif cult to widely and accurately communicate its motives to workers or suppliers, it can be optimal to explicitly separate workers or suppliers into tiers.
5 This seems to match informal explanations for a variety of observed contracting practices.
The next section presents the model and derives the incentive constraints that must be satis ed by bilateral and multilateral contracts. Section III considers stationary environments and outlines a few implications of optimal contracting. Section IV considers the trade-off between bilateral and multilateral contracts in a changing environment. The nal section concludes. Proofs of the results are in the Appendix.
II. THE MODEL

II.A. Technology and Preferences
I consider a simple model of employment as an ongoing relationship. There is a single rm and n workers, who can produce at dates t 5 1, 2 . . . . At each date, the rm chooses whether or not to employ each worker, and simultaneously workers choose whether or not they wish to be employed. Each employed worker i then selects a performance level e t i [ [0,e] ). Pro ts are increasing and concave in the performance of each 5. A somewhat related idea can be found in Fudenberg and Kreps [1987] , who study a reputational model of entry, where a single large rm attempts to simultaneously deter entry in several markets. They show that the large rm may sometimes bene t if its competitors can only observe its actions in their particular market, rather than observing all its actions. The rm must resolve a basic incentive problem. How to induce its workers to perform, given that they must incur a private sacri ce? I take the view that ongoing interaction is crucial to resolving this problem. To this end, suppose that while the rm can monitor worker behavior, it cannot condition a formal incentive contract on performance. Rather, it may commit to pay a xed wage w t i $ 0 to worker i if he is employed at t and promise the worker a discretionary reward b t i $ 0 conditional on performance. I treat both forms of compensation as cash payments, although they could naturally include nonpecuniary benets. Then, worker i's total payment at t, supposing that the rm delivers on the discretionary payment, is W t i 5 w t i 1 b t i . All parties are risk-neutral. Given this, the rm's net pro ts at time t are y t 2 ¥: W t i , while worker i's payoff is W t i 2 c i (e t i ) in the event he is employed and u i $ 0 if he is not. All parties share a common discount factor , meant to capture both pure time preference and any exogenous uncertainty about whether production opportunities will continue (in addition to the rate at which performance is assessed). 7 The joint surplus in a given period is (dropping the t subscript) A relational contract is self-enforcing if it describes an equilibrium of the repeated game. There may be many possible selfenforcing contracts; I focus on the choice between two alternative regimes. Under a multilateral relational contract, any deviation by the rm leads all workers to revert to the static equilibrium. In essence, workers view any deviation by the rm, even one that does not harm them directly, as reason to withdraw their goodwill. I contrast this with the bilateral contracting regime, where workers view their relationship with the rm as distinct from the relationships of other workers. Under a set of bilateral relational contracts, workers revert to the static equilibrium only if the rm deviates from the initial agreement in a way that harms them directly.
II.B. Multilateral Relational Contracts
Bewley [1999] and other management researchers argue that managers hesitate to cut pay or lay off employees because they fear that the result will be a widespread loss of morale among remaining employees. A natural explanation for this is that employees interpret such actions as evidence that a rm may not honor informal commitments in the future. Thus, even selective pay cuts or layoffs are perceived as violating a broader relational contract. This corresponds to an employment equilibrium in which any deviation from anticipated behavior by the rm triggers a general drop in performance-a multilateral relational contract.
Formally, a multilateral relational contract consists of a prole (e,w,b) together with the expectation that if the rm deviates, all workers will cease to perform and the rm's (best-)response will be to stop employing them. Individual nonperformance leads the rm to withhold the shirking employee's bonus and terminate his employment.
8. I restrict attention to stationary contracts where behavior does not change on the equilibrium path of play. There is, however, no gain to nonstationary contracts [MacLeod and Malcomson 1989; Levin 2000] .
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS PROPOSITION 1. There exists a self-enforced multilateral relational contract with performance e if and only if
(1) 1 2~s~e
Self-enforcement requires that the future discounted surplus generated by production be greater than the present costs of all employees. Importantly, and this is the bene t of multilateral contracting, the condition is an aggregate one. There is no restriction on how the surplus generated by individual employees relates to their individual costs.
Implicit in such an arrangement is the idea that employees interpret any deviant behavior by the rm as threatening their own prospects, and also, of course, that they can observe these deviations (here, the assumption is that workers can observe all performance choices and payments). Both these points help shed light on human resource practices. For instance, encouraging informal communication or social interaction between employees, or emphasizing a broad commitment to lifetime employment (as rms such as IBM and Hewlett-Packard have historically done) is consistent with developing a multilateral relational contract.
9
Policies that discourage employee interaction, such as Microsoft's decision to prohibit temporary employees from recreational activities, are clearly antithetical to such a contract.
II.C. Bilateral Relational Contracts
An alternative to multilateral contracting is to structure employment as a set of distinct commitments to individual workers or subsets of workers. For instance, law rms or consultancies may encourage junior associates to focus on their own careers and not worry too much about promises made to their peers. More generally, rms often have quite separate relationships with their blue-and white-collar workers, or with their full-and parttime employees. A characteristic of such situations is that if the rm behaves poorly toward one employee or set of employees, the goodwill of others need not be lost.
If relationships are technologically independent, this can be 9. Unions might also facilitate a coordinated response by workers if the rm behaves opportunistically. I will argue below, however, that employee bargaining power (which one might associate with unionization) can undermine multilateral contracting. 
Production externalities add a few subtleties. First, with externalities, the value of a given worker depends on the performance of others. Second, if worker i is terminated, the rm may want to alter its contracts with its remaining employees. And its ability to do so affects its initial incentives to deviate. With this in mind, I de ne bilateral contracts recursively. A pro le (e,w,b) is speci ed. Following a deviation involving a given set of employees, the affected employees are terminated. The rm then constructs a new (optimal) set of bilateral contracts with the remaining employed workers, possibly using lump-sum payments to redistribute surplus. Here, optimality of the contract means that it is surplus maximizing (within the set of self-enforced contracts). A set of bilateral contracts is self-enforcing if no employee can pro tably deviate, and if the rm cannot pro tably deviate against a set of employees and recontract optimally with the others.
10
De ne s I as the surplus from an optimal bilateral contract where the rm employs some set I of workers. PROPOSITION 2. There exists a set of bilateral relational contracts that support performance e if and only if for any subset I of employed workers
The condition states that the marginal surplus generated by each subset of employees must be greater than their present 10. Self-enforcemen t requires subgame perfection (no one acting alone can pro tably deviate) and a form of coalition-proofness (the rm cannot pro tably deviate in concert with a subset of employees). Note that two issues are resolved in the de nition. First, contractual revisions must themselves be self-enforcing. Second, the rm may only recontract with other employed workers. An alternative approach would be to allow it to recontract with unemployed workers as well. While this would not matter under technological independence, it would make enforcement more dif cult if workers were substitutable.
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costs. A detailed characterization requires a series of steps. Starting with the fact that s A 5 s(A), one nds the optimal contract with a single employee i, and hence s {i} . In turn, the optimal contract with any two employees is derived-checking deviations against either one or both-and so on. Absent externalities, this sequential process is unnecessary. The set of self-enforcing bilateral contracts is described by (2).
III. OPTIMAL RELATIONAL CONTRACTS
The bene t of establishing a multilateral contract is that the rm ensures that any deviant behavior it undertakes will have severe consequences. By committing itself more strongly, it can offer a broader range of incentives. This is seen formally by noting that (1) is just one of the (many) constraints that must hold under bilateral contracting. The next section shows that this commitment may come at a cost when the environment is unstable, if it makes necessary contractual adjustments costly. Before enriching the model in this direction, however, I rst take up a few of the key implications of bilateral and multilateral contracting in the stationary environment developed above. I show that the two arrangements have divergent implications for the balance of incentives across the rm and for the structure of compensation. I also observe that two factors, the rm's bargaining power vis-à -vis its employees and the nature of production externalities, greatly in uence the potential gains from multilateral contracting.
An important point is that these distinctions depend on there being a meaningful tension between present incentives not to perform and future gains from contracting. If the future is negligible ( 0), no contract of any kind may be self-enforcing. On the other hand, when the future is in nitely important ( 1), both bilateral and multilateral contracts (and many others) will allow rst-best performance. I concentrate here on second-best situations-those where employment is possible, but incentive constraints matter.
III.A. Balancing Incentives
As in the multimarket contact literature, multilateral contracting allows the rm to use some relationships to "cross-subsidize" others. In the employment context, optimal contracts involve a particularly transparent form of cross subsidization: the rm uses a multilateral contract to balance the shadow costs of incentive provision across the organization.
Assuming technological independence (a similar analysis applies with externalities), an optimal multilateral contract solves
The Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions are
where e i,M is the optimal performance for worker i under the multilateral contract, and $ 0 is the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive constraint.
Optimal bilateral contracts solve
The corresponding Kuhn-Tucker conditions are
where e i,B is the optimal performance for i under a bilateral contract, and i $ 0 is now a distinct multiplier that attaches to i's constraint.
Applying the natural economic interpretation of the Lagrange multipliers, the optimal multilateral contract equalizes the shadow price of incentive provision across relationships. Since at both optima the shadow price on incentives for a given employee is proportional to the ratio of marginal bene ts and costs of that employee's performance, a multilateral contract essentially has the effect of using relationships where this bene tcost ratio is low to cross-subsidize those where it is high. 12 11. I assume throughout this section that it is always possible and pro table to employ all workers. This is easily relaxed, but at some cost in terms of expositional clarity.
12. Bernheim and Whinston [1990] obtain an equalization result in their analysis of symmetric collusive equilibria with differentiated products (Section VII). In their case, optimal collusion equalizes the ratio of marginal pro ts from collusion to marginal pro ts from deviation across markets.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS PROPOSITION 3. Multilateral contracting generates more surplus than bilateral contracting by equalizing the ratio of marginal bene ts and marginal costs of performance across relationships.
The equalization of incentives suggests that multilateral contracts might give rise to a form of pay compression, such as is observed in many large organizations. However, while incentive equalization might translate into wage equalization under some conditions, it need not in general. Indeed, it need not even imply that worker's net marginal products (d y i /de i 2 dc i /de i ) be equalized at the optimum.
III.B. Structure of Compensation: Tournaments
A pervasive feature of many organizations is that compensation has elements of a tournament. Even apart from the explicit use of relative performance evaluation, promotions, the assignment of desirable tasks, and individual awards (e.g., "employee of the month") induce competition among employees. Incentive theory has traditionally argued that the role of relative performance evaluation is to provide insurance for workers whose performance measures are positively correlated.
13 Interestingly, relative performance evaluation turns out to be broadly optimal when employment is structured as a multilateral contract, if performance is measured imperfectly.
14 This result does not depend on risk aversion or on correlation in performance measurement. Rather, it results from the multilateral nature of the contract; with bilateral contracting, relative performance evaluation is not useful.
Suppose that each agent's performance e i is not observed directly, but generates an observable measure x i with continuous density f i ( x i u e i ). These stochastic measures are independent, and satisfy the Mirrlees-Rogerson conditions from incentive theory, so that each agent's performance choice can be characterized by a rst-order condition. A relational contract speci es performance levels e i , xed payments w i , and discretionary payments 13. Malcomson [1984] argues that rank-order tournaments are also appealing relative to piece rates because they do not require performance to be contracted on directly and because they give the employer no incentive to misrepresent outcomes.
14. An interesting contrast to this result is provided by Che and Yoo [2001] . They show that if the rm sets a static incentive scheme, and workers then attempt to cooperate over time to maximize their joint payoffs given this incentive scheme, then joint performance evaluation (positively correlating payments) can be optimal. PROPOSITION 4. Suppose that performance is measured imperfectly and there is technological independence. With bilateral contracts, each employee's compensation is independent and based on his own performance measure. With a multilateral contract, relative performance evaluation is optimal: specifically, the optimal incentive scheme is a modi ed tournament that awards a xed prize to at most one employee.
The argument for the result proceeds as follows. Self-enforcement limits the level of discretionary pay the rm can credibly promise. With bilateral contracts, this places an independent restriction on each worker's compensation, but with a multilateral contract, self-enforcement limits only the total payment. So the rm essentially has a xed pool of money (of endogenous size) to reward performance. A standard argument shows that promising an extra dollar to employee i in the event of outcome (
, where i is the (positive) shadow price on i's rst-order condition for performance choice. Thus, to provide optimal incentives, the rm must compare the workers' weighted likelihood ratios, leading to a relative performance criterion. That the optimal contract has a tournament character follows from risk neutrality. 15 Under bilateral contracting, the rm still wants to reward each worker based on his or her likelihood ratio, but there is no motive for relative evaluation. The rm optimally gives each worker an independent "one-step" incentive scheme: paying the maximum reward following a good outcome ( x i greater than some cutoff) and no reward following a bad outcome [Levin 2000] .
III.C. Employee Bargaining Power
One notable aspect of multilateral contracting is that its largest gains are realized only if the rm enjoys signi cant bargaining power vis-à -vis its employees. This point is of interest if one considers the role of unions or other employee organizations in supporting a relational contract. Because such institutions 15. With risk aversion, relative performance evaluation would still be benecial, but it need not take such a stark form. One reason not to introduce risk aversion in this dynamic setting, however, is that in addition to creating a motive for smoothing payments, it also creates a motive to smooth intertemporally, leading to a much less tractable analysis.
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facilitate coordinated action by workers, there is a plausible argument that they could play a positive role in committing rms to behave well toward employees. The model suggests that this effect can be counteracted if they simultaneously reduce the rm's bargaining power.
To incorporate bargaining power into the model, suppose that at the outset of each period, the rm and its employees bargain over the continuing gains to trade (the surplus over and above s(A)), setting compensation accordingly. Suppose that the rm is able to command a share of these gains, so its net pro ts in any period are (s(e) 2 s(A)), while employees capture the remainder. In particular, suppose that each worker i captures a share i . If is higher, the rm will be able to promise larger end-of-period bonuses to reward performance, but on the other hand, workers will be less concerned with the threat of being red.
PROPOSITION 5. Under technological independence, greater employee bargaining power (lower ) lowers the joint surplus under multilateral contracting but not under bilateral contracting.
To see the argument, note that the rm's claim on future surplus is what gives it an incentive to deliver on discretionary compensation (any b i . 0). Similarly, any claim on future surplus gives an employee a reason to perform even if it is not in his short-term interest (even if c i (e i ) , b i ). However, there is a key difference with multilateral contracting. If the rm claims the future surplus, it may make credible commitments to any employee. But if worker i has a claim on some share of future surplus, it can be used only to enforce i's present performance and not to motivate j. Therefore, cross subsidization relies on the rm being in a relatively strong bargaining position.
With bilateral contracts the inability to cross-subsidize is irrelevant. If the rm commands any share of the future gains, then by setting b i 5 (s i (e i ) 2 s i (A)) (and choosing w i to ensure the right division of surplus), it is always possible to nd a contract that will enforce e i if and only if e i satis es the general bilateral constraint (2). Thus, a change in bargaining power changes the structure of compensation-the rm relies more on discretionary bonuses and less on high up-front wages if it has greater bargaining power-but not optimal incentives.
III.D. Production Externalities
One further issue concerns the types of workers that are best grouped under a multilateral contract. The model suggests that the bene ts of multilateral contracting are likely to be greatest when employees are substitutes in the production process. The reason is that the availability of substitute labor tends to undermine the rm's ability to make bilateral commitments. This problem often does not arise when employee performance is complementary. In this case bilateral contracts may do just as well as multilateral. An implication is that the gains to grouping employees who perform similar tasks, or have similar talents, may be large relative to the gains from grouping disparate employees.
To develop this point, consider two workers with production given by y(e 1 ,e 2 ). Workers are complementary (substitutable) if y(e i ,e j ) has positive (negative) cross-partial derivatives. To state the next result, let ê i denote the performance that is induced in an optimal single-worker contract with i.
PROPOSITION 6. (i) If workers are substitutable, bilateral contracts
are strictly worse than multilateral unless both achieve rstbest. 16 (ii) If workers are complementary, bilateral contracts are as effective as multilateral whenever the optimal multilateral contract sets e i $ ê i for i 5 1,2 and ê i is not rst-best (i.e., does not maximize s(e i ,A)).
IV. CONTRACTUAL ADJUSTMENT
The model developed above suggests that rms bene t from making broad multilateral commitments to their employees because such commitments are harder to back away from. A potential downside of being bound to a broad set of implicit promises is that organizational changes may become dif cult or costly to implement. The idea that rms nd it extremely dif cult to adjust employment practices in response to macroeconomic or more speci c shocks is a central theme of human resource studies [Doeringer and Piore 1971; Bewley 1999] . And there is anecdotal evidence that organizational changes can be particularly problematic at rms where employees have long-standing expecta-16. Recently Spagnolo [1999] has shown a related result: if rms compete in two markets and have utility functions that are submodular in the pro ts from the two markets (e.g., have concave utility over the sum of pro ts), then multimarket contact will facilitate collusion.
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tions of job security or particular bene ts (Baron and Kreps [1999] provide some insightful examples). Rogers and Beer [1995] , for instance, describe Hewlett-Packard's dif cult move away from a long-time implicit promise of lifetime employment in response to increased demand volatility in the 1980s. They document the employee discontent and loss of morale at the time. Interestingly, one step taken by HP was to initiate a conservative hiring policy and rely more on temporary and " ex-force" workers [Rogers and Beer 1995] . As described in the Introduction, Microsoft more recently has adopted a strategy of hiring both temporary and permanent employees. Indeed, the popular press reports a growing tendency, particularly in high-tech, toward this sort of "two-tier" employment system. Abraham and Taylor [1996] provide some empirical evidence that one motivation for such contracting out can be to buffer the permanent workforce from shocks.
17
In this section the model is extended to capture the idea that by targeting its promises to employees a rm can manage expectations about how it will respond to shocks. In contrast to the earlier setup, it is assumed that the environment is not stable but changes over time. Initially, the rm proposes a set of stationary contracts. It may change these contracts at the beginning of each period, but doing so involves communicating with all involved workers. I assume that this process is dif cult in that it involves some probability of miscommunication. The assumption is meant to capture the idea that a successful relationship requires a high level of shared information, and that maintaining this level of mutual understanding when the environment changes is dif cult. Indeed, Bewley [1999] cites managers as saying that their workers would not respond negatively to selective pay cuts or layoffs if these actions could be clearly explained and justi ed. Since Bewley's managers also report not making these changes, it seems likely that they believe such explanations are nontrivial. In the next section I simply assume that communication may fail, in which case workers who were supposed to be informed of the change are not. They then act contrary to the new agreement, or 17. There are other reasons why rms might want to contract out, some of which are discussed by Abraham and Taylor [1996] . Buffering the permanent workforce seems to have been one of Microsoft's motivations: "Microsoft was concerned about the volatile and unsettled nature of the industry, and with how to achieve the ultimate goal of avoiding the potential for layoffs or overstaf ng," Microsoft lawyer, quoted in "Revenge of the Temps," by Kirstin Downey Grimsley, Washington Post, January 16, 2000, Section H, Page 1. interpret the rm's actions as contrary to their (now outdated) expectations. In subsection IV.B I show how "miscommunication " can arise as an equilibrium phenomenon if there is asymmetric information about the necessity of layoffs.
Introducing a cost to contractual adjustment has two effects: rst, even with a single agent, it introduces inertia into the way relational contracts adapt to shocks; second, it means that altering multilateral contracts may be more costly than altering bilateral contracts. I focus on the latter effect-while inertia is an important issue in structuring long-term relationships, a careful consideration would lead too far a eld.
IV.A. Adjustment Costs and Contracting
Suppose that there are two workers who initially, if employed, generate gross pro ts y i (e i ). With Poisson probability 1 2 , a one-time shock arrives. Following the shock, the rm requires only the rst worker-the second has negative value. At this point, the rm will let the second worker go and potentially adjust the contract of the rst. I assume that a contract can be adjusted successfully with probability 1 2 .
The rm can avoid contractual adjustment by using bilateral contracts. The optimal contract with the rst worker solves ). There is no need to explain changes following the shock: the rst worker's contract remains the same; while the second is let go. Now suppose that the initial contract is multilateral. Following the shock, the rm must lay off the second worker, and can successfully explain the layoff with probability 1 2 . If successful, future performance will be e 1,B
. If communication is not successful, the ring of the second worker will be interpreted as a breach of the initial contract in which case the rst will sanction the rm by quitting. Prior to the shock, the effort pro le of the optimal multilateral contract is the solution to
where 5 (1 2 )/(1 2 ) is the present value share of future periods before the shock. Denote the performance level that solves this program as e M 5 (e 1,M ,e 2,M ).
PROPOSITION 7. A multilateral contract is optimal if and only if the gains from cross subsidization are greater than the cost of contractual adjustment; i.e., if
The gains from multilateral enforcement depend on the value of balancing initial incentives as well as the expected waiting time until the environment changes. The more stable the environment, the greater the gain from multilateral enforcement. On the other hand, the expected adjustment costs are increasing in the probability of miscommunication and in the value of the rst relationship, but decreasing in the expected waiting time until the shock arrives. If the initial environment is stable and there exist gains to equalizing incentives, a multilateral contract will be optimal. If the environment is unstable, and especially if the rst worker is valuable, the rm prefers a bilateral contracting regime.
IV.B. Asymmetric Information and Adjustment Costs
The model above incorporates adjustment costs by simply assuming that communication is imperfect, so the rm cannot costlessly restructure its relational contract with the worker who remains after the layoff. Similar dynamics arise with no direct assumption about imperfect communication, but rather as an equilibrium phenomenon, if there is asymmetric information about the necessity of layoffs, so the rm cannot credibly communicate its intentions. The underlying logic is similar to Green and Porter [1984] , where asymmetric information necessitates equilibrium price wars among colluding rms. The novel implication is that these equilibrium sanctions can be so costly in terms of forgone surplus from the relationship with "core" workers that the gains to providing incentives for "peripheral" workers are swamped.
Consider the same situation, where the rm initially can employ two workers, but with Poisson probability 1 2 must lay off the second worker. The rm learns the necessity of this layoff immediately prior to paying the previous period's bonus. That is, if the second worker must be laid off in period t, the rm learns of this prior to paying b t21 . The rst worker does not observe whether conditions necessitate a layoff, but does observe the rm's behavior toward the second worker. For clarity, assume that performance is a binary choice, so that e i [ {0,e}. With bilateral contracts, the performance of the rst worker can be ensured if and only if
while the performance of the second worker can be ensured if and only if
There are several cases depending on whether these constraints are satis ed, but the interesting situation is where only the performance of the rst worker can be ensured under bilateral contracts.
18 Assume that this is the case, the per-period surplus under bilateral contracting is
A multilateral contract works by specifying compensation (w,b) and enforcing performance as follows. If either worker fails to perform, the rm withholds discretionary compensation and res the worker. If the rm deviates against the rst worker, both workers quit. If the rm fails to pay or res the second worker, the second worker departs, and the rst departs with probability . With prob-18. If neither constraint is satis ed, then neither bilateral or multilateral contracting can induce any performance, while if both are satis ed, then bilateral contracts already achieve the rst-best and there is no bene t to multilateral contracting. If the second constraint is satis ed, but the rst fails, the rst worker will necessarily depart when the second worker does. In this case, multilateral contracting may be bene cial if it can induce the rst worker to perform prior to the layoff.
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QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS ability 1 2 , the rst remains as an employee at the same compensation, and that employment relationship continues.
19
Under a multilateral contract, the second worker's performance is supported by surplus generated by the second worker, and by the rst worker's threat to quit if there is mistreatment. This sort of cross subsidization is feasible whenever
However, cross subsidization now comes at a cost. In equilibrium the rm will nd it necessary to terminate the second worker, and the rst will quit inef ciently with probability . This cost of adjustment must be set large enough so that the rm does not have an incentive to terminate the second worker unnecessarily and claim necessity. Formally, must be chosen so that
The optimal contract selects the smallest that satis es the constraint.
The surplus from a multilateral contract that induces performance by both workers (normalized by (1 2 )) will be
Substituting in the optimal gives
PROPOSITION 8. Multilateral contracting improves on bilateral contracting if and only if
19. A clever alternative that this rules out is for the rm to promise a transfer (or pay raise) to the rst worker in the event that it res the second. Such an arrangement can solve the problem of the rm wanting to deviate by ring just the second worker. However, it succeeds only by giving the rst worker a corresponding incentive to get rid of the second worker. So if the rst worker can induce the second to quit, the cost of cross subsidization immediately returns, and the analysis is identical to what is done here. 
IV.C. Two-Tier Contract Structures
The dif culty of contractual adjustment can be used to explain the use of "two-tier" (or multitier) contract structures. Suppose that the rm initially employs n workers, each of whom produces s(e) 1 z i . With Poisson probability 1 2 , the environment changes, and the rm requires only m , n workers. Returning to the case of exogenous adjustment costs (a similar result can be given with endogenous adjustment costs), suppose that the rm faces a probability of miscommunicating with any agent who is retained, and whose contract the rm wishes to adjust (these probabilities can be independent or correlated).
The following proposition shows that of the many possible initial contract structures, only a relatively few could possibly be optimal.
PROPOSITION 9. There is always an optimal contract structure involving either a single multilateral contract with all employees, or a pair of contracts with two distinct groups of workers. With two groups, one is stable and composed only of workers to be retained, while the other includes all agents to be released and possibly workers to be retained as well.
The argument is a simple one. If the rm contracts separately with two groups of workers, all of whom are to be retained, it can do at least as well by reaching a uni ed agreement with both groups. On the other hand, if the rm contracts separately with two groups of workers, both of which contain employees who are to be released, it will have to recontract with any worker in either group who is to be retained. Thus, joining the groups initially in a single contract involves no additional cost and potential multilateral enforcement gains. It follows that there will be an optimal contract with at most one group that includes agents to be released and (potentially) another group that contains only agents to be retained.
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V. CONCLUSION
Many aspects of employment can be usefully thought of as elements of a long-term relational contract between a rm and its workers. Such contracts capture the idea that workers are motivated by the prospect of continuing employment or by rewards that are never formally guaranteed in advance, while rms are discouraged from short-term expropriation by the prospect of alienating employees. In such a setting, rms face important choices in how to structure workers' expectations. By encouraging workers to view its behavior broadly, a rm can effectively commit itself to better treatment of employees. Such a strategy, however, risks widespread problems if the rm wants to make changes at a later date. If the environment is volatile in ways that cannot be perfectly planned for in advance, it may be better to make more targeted commitments and create separate relationships with different employees or sets of employees.
The dynamics described by the model apply best to rms where workers have relatively high expectations about the rm's behavior (i.e., where a relational contract is a good description of the employment relationship). Consider, for instance, the case of Lincoln Electric Company, a manufacturer of arc welding equipment that is widely noted for its use of piece-rate incentives and high productivity. Lincoln's recruitment materials emphasize that the company has not laid off workers in over 50 years and has paid an annual year-end bonus to each worker for over 60 years. The cost of backing away from these policies, even by making targeted layoffs or withholding the bonus of some deserving workers, would presumably be quite large. Indeed, in an article recounting Lincoln's experience in 1992 when it suffered large losses from poorly planned overseas expansion, former CEO Donald Hastings stressed that management's crucial concern was nding suf cient resources to pay the annual bonus for U. S. workers. As he explained it, "if we didn't pay the bonus, the whole company might unravel" [Hastings 1999 ].
The dif culties of backing away from a perceived broad commitment to employees are further illustrated by the many case studies of rms that have found themselves forced to make layoffs or other changes when their market position changed. Mills and Freisen [1996] document IBM's experience in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when it instituted widespread layoffs for the rst time in response to operating losses. Although IBM offered no formal guarantee of employment security, Mills and Freisen argue that the layoffs were widely perceived as violating an implicit promise to the workforce and that this led to signi cant discontent and loss of morale.
Interestingly, like Hewlett-Packard, one of IBM's responses following layoffs was to increase reliance on ex-force and parttime employees. At both companies, there is reason to suspect that one motivation for doing so was to allow full-time workers a measure of job security as in the above model. I have argued above that Microsoft could have had similar motives as well. Given the striking rise in temporary and contingent employment over the last decade, an intriguing empirical question is how important this buffering explanation is relative to other motives for using contingent labor.
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Moving beyond employment, the general trade-off considered in this paper is relevant for other organizational decisions as well. For instance, many researchers have stressed that long-term relationships are a central feature of the supply contracting that takes place in Japanese manufacturing [Dore 1983; Williamson 1985; Taylor and Wiggins 1997] . A number of aspects of these relationships are usefully thought of as multilateral. As an example, Williamson [p. 121] describes Toyota's practice of organizing suppliers into loose-knit associations that serve as a forum to discuss reputationally relevant information. Dore reports similar arrangements in other Japanese enterprise groups. Part of the function of these supplier groups seems to be to help promote coordinated sanctions in the event of questionable behavior by a manufacturer.
An in-depth study of the Japanese automotive and electronic sectors by Asanuma [1989] suggests a further subtlety. Asanuma observes the practices cited by Williamson [1985] and Dore [1983] , but notes that manufacturers tend to class their suppliers into different tiers. Relationships with rst-tier suppliers are generally secure, but there may be signi cant turnover among lower-tier suppliers. Asanuma hypothesizes that one value of 20. Among the other explanations for the increase in contingent labor is that courts have increasingly limited the ability of rms to terminate "full-time" employees-in essence turning what was previously a relational contract into a formal legal commitment. Another is that having two modes of employment allows rms to screen different types of workers. The popular press emphasizes contingent labor as a cost-saving device, claiming that rms prefer hiring contingent workers to whom they can pay low wages and bene ts. It is not obvious how the last story ts with standard economic theory.
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having marginal suppliers is that they act as a buffer that helps to protect relations with upper-tier suppliers, something that is particularly important in periods of uncertain or intermittent demand. Thus, there seem to be both bilateral and multilateral elements at work.
A further related problem concerns customer relationships. Since Klein and Lef er [1981] , it has been common to view a rm's reputation for quality as an implicit contract with consumers. To capture this, the model must be turned around, so that the "workers" pay the " rm" to perform but the choice between bilateral and multilateral contracts is still relevant. It can be interpreted, for instance, as the choice between maintaining a set of distinct and separate brands and building a more general reputation for quality. An in-depth analysis of this problem would be interesting to pursue. In addition, the rm can always identify a subset I of employees, withhold the discretionary payments to other employees, and then recontract with those in I, terminating the others. For this to be unpro table, it must be that for each subset I of employees, Summing (4) and (5) The rst condition is an incentive compatibility condition for each agent's effort choice. The second is a self-enforcement constraint. To see that these conditions are suf cient, set w i 5 u i . It is easily checked that agents are willing to choose e i and that the rm will deliver payments rather than terminate all relationships. As for necessity, clearly (6) must hold. And if (7) fails, the rm will renege on payments for some x, or not all workers will agree to be employed.
The optimal contract solves max e,b~x! s~e! subject to~6!,~7!.
